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1.  An overlooked  concept for  a sociological analysis of education: unintended consequences 
of action  
The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that actions always have 
effects that are unanticipated or unintended. The concept of unintended consequences is one of the 
building blocks of economics: Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, maybe the most famous metaphor in 
social science, is an example of a positive unintended consequence. Smith maintained that each 
individual, seeking only his own gain, is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention, that end being the public interest. “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, or the baker, that we expect our dinner”, Smith wrote, “but from regard to their own self 
interest” (Smith, 1776/1977). 
In the first half of the nineteenth century Frédéric Bastiat often distinguished in his writing between 
the “seen” and the “unseen.” The “seen” were the obvious visible consequences of an action or 
policy. The “unseen” were the less obvious, and often unintended, consequences. In an essay, titled  
“What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen” Bastiat wrote: “here is only one difference between a bad 
economist and a good one: the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good 
economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must 
be foreseen” (Bastiat, 1848/1995: 1).   
In the  influential article titled “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action” 
(1936), Robert K. Merton extended  the analysis of the concept of unintended consequences to all 
fields of society. In this article, Merton analyzed and classified types and determinants of 
unanticipated consequences of purposive action. Since Merton’s groundbreaking article, the 
problem of unintended and unanticipated   pertained not only to economy but also to the 
effectiveness of practices and the boundaries of social planning. This is particularly important for  
education, which is the most ambitious social system with regard to social planning, aiming to 
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produce and preserve the presuppositions of social cohesion.   In fact, for decades now, pedagogical 
theories  have been experiencing severe  difficulties in avoiding  the unintended consequences of 
educational intentions.  
For Merton, the functions of a social practice are its “observable objective consequences” (Merton, 
1936). Manifest functions are those outcomes that are intended and recognized by the agents 
concerned; latent functions are those outcomes that are neither intended nor recognized. With 
regard to the educational system, this defines a contrast between the expressed or manifest purposes 
of the official curriculum, and the latent functions of the system which are fulfilled alongside of the 
official curriculum.  A hidden curriculum is promulgated by how schools are organized and 
operated as much as by explicit teaching methods and content, and may be far from the expressed 
motives of teachers and curriculum planners. The concept of hidden curriculum is built by means of 
Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent functions (Merton 1957), to define the contrast 
between the expressed or manifest purposes of the official curriculum, and the latent functions of 
the system which are fulfilled alongside of the official curriculum. 
Although the distinction between manifest and latent functions has been the object  of sociological 
critical accounts  (Campbell, 1982), pedagogical research towards  the  unintended consequences of 
an educational system that aims to rationalize socialization still uses it as a basic  analytic concept 
(see Kendall, 1998). For its part, sociology has not always been concerned about the unintended 
consequences in the field of  education; for Parsons (Parsons et al. 1951), socialization (which 
includes education) fulfilled a fairly unambiguous role within society: due to socialization, 
individuals bear the stamp of their social environment, their inner structure is determined by the 
norms and value orientations of the society in which they live. The idea of  human beings as open 
systems,  exchanging input and output with the environment, of which Parsons made use, lead to an 
“oversocialized view of man” and woman. That human beings dispose of means to make use of 
their individual degrees of freedom, for instance, cannot adequately be taken into account.  
A more realistic approach,  giving attention to the mutual operational closure of psychic systems 
and social systems, suggests that it is not possible to describe socialization in terms of the transfer 
of a meaning pattern from one system (society) to the other (the individual). In fact, the interaction 
between a human being and his or her social environment might or might not provoke particular 
structural changes in the “inner sphere” of the individual. Looking  at the interactional foundations 
of the educational relationship, unintended consequences emerges as a concept that any sociological 
analysis of education should take into account: when a pedagogically stylized act communicates its 
own intention, the person who is expected to be educated acquires the freedom to travel some 
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distance, for instance, to pursue the intention out of mere opportunism or to avoid “being educated” 
as much as possible. One can describe these effects as unintended consequences of intentional 
socialization,  referring to the consequences of the particular social settings that are used to educate. 
Thus, an interesting question, of concern to educators and educational scientists, is whether the 
possibility of  unintended consequences of pedagogical action may be eliminated through 
pedagogical means.   
According to Luhmann, “education is action that is intentionalized and attributable to intentions” 
(Luhmann 1984: 244); education aims to attain something that cannot be left to chance socializing 
events, something that presupposes coordinating a plurality of efforts. Education differs from 
socialization: socialization is limited by stimuli of the socializing context, while education strives 
for a particular, “unusual” output.  The modes of behavior that one would like to achieve are 
defined,  the pedagogical means to achieve what could not occur by itself are chosen. 
Once a relatively high degree of complexity is reached, societies cannot avoid going beyond mere 
socialization and mere ad hoc education. “Only thus can they reproduce knowledge and capabilities 
acquired in long sequences of coordinated individual steps. Only this enables processes of 
specialization and the distribution of roles on the basis of specialization” (Luhmann 1984:  206). 
The current large-scale organization of learning situations, school classes, and school systems is an  
illustration of the application of this principle.   
Socialization comes about by living in a social context. It presupposes the possibility of reading the 
behavior of others as selected information such as potential dangers or social expectations 
(Vanderstraeten 2000); the meaning of this communication can be rejected if the addressee or 
receiver finds the information unsatisfactory or unacceptable. Education cannot eliminate this 
possibility of resistance. It cannot be conceived of as the rational form of socialization. In fact, 
intentional communication with educational goals doubles the motives for rejection. In any 
communication,  the meaning can be rejected if the addressee or receiver finds the information not 
only unsatisfactory but also unacceptable, and  education has no magic weapons to eliminate this 
possibility of resistance. The addressee has the opportunity to reject the communication, if he or she 
refuses the role of someone who needs to be educated.  One can underpin this conclusion with a 
simple social experiment: try to educate someone who does not expect to be educated, for example 
a young boy or girl you meet by chance on the street. It is indeed very likely that your efforts will 
not be appreciated and will fail.  
In sum, education cannot guarantee that socialization will be successful: unintended consequences 
are always possible in education. In fact, there are many options: students can react with total 
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rejection, but also with unexpectedly good performance, with nonchalance vis-a-vis evaluation 
criteria, with humor and irony, with the celebration of a deviant school or youth subculture, with 
deviant or alternative assessments of qualities and personal merits, and so on. 
Before the  “crisis of education” became a major concern for education scientists and politics in the 
1950’s, pedagogy used to understand education as social engineering, which task relies  on  a  linear 
logic  in  which  goals  are  manifest  and  the task  consists  of  devising  means  to  achieve them. 
Thus, education was understood as a linear  process  which may be   represented  by  a  straight  
arrow between the avowed goal of actors and  the  achieved end-state. In fact, it took a long time for 
pedagogy to understand that “the crisis of education” was nothing more than a translation to the 
political agenda of  its structural limits (Arendt 1961/1993),  that is, the incapacity to control the 
development of children’s personality, calling to mind James’ idea of the inescapable role of 
children in their own development (James, 1899/1983).  
James’ assumption that  the development of children’s minds cannot be completely controlled by 
educational techniques, because of the  independence of  psychic processes through which people 
attribute meanings to communication, could be integrated in a more extensive concept developed by 
Portes (2000):  in any social relationship, a possible derailing  factor  to purposive designs is that 
participants may react to being manipulated by a higher authority and devise means of by passing 
the intended consequences of their actions. Thus, even if  the announced goal is intended  by  the 
educators,  their  actions  may have other  significant, and often unintended,  consequences  which 
the educators cannot control,  and of which they are unaware.  
The unintended results of education cannot be eliminated with the help of a careful selection of 
subject matter, no matter how much this selection focuses on usefulness in later, professional life, 
on “pure” intellectual development or on the students’ life world and interests: they inevitably 
appear in an educational context.  Facing these problems, for  decades pedagogy has devoted 
theoretical and methodological efforts to avoid the unintended consequences of education: “trust 
building” between educators and students appears to be one of the most relevant strategy.  
 
2. Three basis of trust in educational relationship: expertise, affectivity, inequality. Their 
limits and their consequences  
Education is the most important social system involving trust of children, which should support 
acceptance of teaching, requests of learning and evaluation. Education is a system where 
interactions are of the greatest importance: trusting commitment in specific interactions with 
teachers is vital for the reproduction of education.  For this reason, education is  particularly 
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affected by lack of trust, which creates perverse effects as alienation, prevents commitment and 
leaves the floor to disappointment of expectations. For Giddens (1990; 1991), modern societies, and 
the education systems within modern societies,  have two options for building trust.  
Firstly, trust can be built through expertise, which guarantees basic presuppositions of action and 
relationships. This way of building trust, however, is considered weak in motivating to 
commitment, and can easily fail when expertise proves ineffective in facing risks. Secondly, trust 
can be achieved through interpersonal affective relationships, which mobilize it through a process 
of mutual disclosure. In this second case, trusting commitment concerns the relationship in itself, a 
“pure relationship” (Giddens 1991), and trust results in a demand for intimacy. Interpersonal 
affective relationships seem to be much more motivating than expertise but it is not possible to give 
up trust in expertise in social systems where actions can only be based on expertise; for example, 
trust in educational,  medical or economic expertise seems to be unavoidable.  
For many decades, pedagogical reflections on education have been connecting  children’s trust and 
commitment in education  exclusively or primarily with their trust in adults’ expert guidance, 
counselling and teaching (Vanderstraeten 2003, Britzman 2007). However, since the 1980’s, 
childhood studies challenge this representation of the relationship between children and adults. 
According to these studies, children cannot be considered passive recipients of adults’ information 
and command (Jenks 1996); on the contrary, they are social agents who actively participate in the 
construction of social systems (James et al. 1998). Children have their own agendas and concerns 
which may go beyond the institutional scopes of education and the mere self-interest in educational 
career; the educational relationship is a different environment for adults and children, who may take 
into account risk which are neglected by adults. Therefore, social attention moves towards 
children’s trusting commitment and necessity of building trust in their relationships with adults 
(Hill et al. 2004). 
Lack of trust activates a vicious circle between lack of trust and social participation (Luhmann 
1988): it implies loosing opportunities of children’s action, reducing their preparation to risk trust, 
and activating anxiety and suspicion for educators’ actions. One can describe these effects as 
secondary socialization, when “secondary” refers to the consequences of the methods that are used 
to educate. Some of these consequences are of course currently fairly well known: distrust in 
interactions with specific teachers can determine children’s marginalization or self-marginalization 
in the education system, with possible drop-out and consequent reduction of effectiveness of 
education in society; these may be understood as unintended consequences of education. 
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Critical pedagogy and childhood studies have questioned the effectiveness of teachers’ expertise in 
promoting students’ trusting commitment. According to childhood studies, in education, children’s 
opportunities of participation are strongly reduced “by curricular and behavioural rules and 
structures” (Wyness 1999: 356), that is, by the latent functions of the system which are fulfilled 
alongside of the official curricula.  The success of person-centred approaches in critical pedagogy 
demonstrates this change of perspective in education: Carl Rogers (1951) suggests that teachers 
should risk interpersonal affective relationships with students, listening to their personal 
expressions and supporting them empathically. In other words, teachers should understand that 
children are social agents who can and must tackle important issues, “dancing” with them 
(Holdsworth 2004: 150). These ideas have inspired the concept of facilitation.   
Facilitation means supporting children’s self-expression, taking their views into account, consulting 
them, involving them in decision-making processes, sharing power and responsibility for decision 
making with them (Matthews 2003). This transformation of cultural presuppositions is important 
for the construction of children’s citizenship. It leads to consider citizenship as based on principles 
of co-operation as well as critical and responsible participation (Osler 2005). Citizenship requires 
the empowerment of different ideas and perspectives; therefore education to citizenship should 
encourage critical thinking and responsible participation, inviting children both to assert their rights 
(Invernizzi and Williams 2008) and to accept different perspectives. This is precisely what 
facilitation tries to promote: building trust though the experience of active citizenship, in order to 
avoid the risk of marginalization and feelings of alienation which among the unintended 
consequences of education. 
However, facilitation  may meet important obstacles in conditions of radical distrust, which prevent 
from the construction of person-centred relationships and affective expectations. Kelman (2005) 
analyses conditions of radical distrust and building trust in workshops involving Israeli and 
Palestinian representatives trying to reach peaceful agreements. In these workshops, Kelman 
analyses the difficulty of building trust when mutual distrust is the basis of the interaction. 
According to Luhmann (1984), while trust enlarges the range of possible actions in a social system, 
distrust restricts this range, in that it requires additional premises for social relationships, which 
protect interactants from a disappointment that is considered highly probable. When distrust is 
established, building trust appears very difficult because the interaction is permeated by trust in 
distrust. 
Trust in distrust seems to be incompatible with the reproduction of social systems because it 
provokes institutional mistrust. According to Kelman, in this condition trust can be built through 
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successive approximations of increasing degrees of commitment, starting from the building of a 
feeble trust which does not commit participants to anything relevant. Therefore, trust does not 
presuppose sympathy, friendship, and interpersonal closeness. On the contrary, trust can be built 
only on self-interest, enhancing mutually acceptable accommodation and joint solution of specific 
problems, and thus being working trust.  Self-interest is contrasted with interest in the other, which 
is the basis of interpersonal affective relationships; working trust and interpersonal relationships 
(self-interest and interest in the other) can merge, but only at a later stage of the interaction. 
Interpersonal closeness is not the basis of trusting commitment and  may only be created after 
working trust has been built. In other terms, trust building is expected as an unintended 
consequence of self-interest. 
Kelman agrees that trust can be built through facilitation. Facilitation, however, regards interactive 
problem-solving activities.  The facilitator has the task “to create the conditions that allow ideas for 
resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interactions between the parties themselves” (Kelman 
2005: 642). Facilitators set rules for the discussion and monitor their respect, helping participants to 
create constructive and non-adversarial debates. They do not participate in the actual discussion, do 
not offer their own perspectives or solutions, nor evaluate the parties’ ideas. Facilitators must be the 
repository of trust, “bridging the gap of mutual distrust that divides the parties and enabling them to 
enter into a process of direct communication” (Kelman 2005: 645). Ultimately, facilitation 
establishes the preconditions for mutual trust, i.e. mutual humanization and mutual reassurance, 
based on acknowledgment of participants’ needs and fears and on responsiveness to them.  Both 
parties must show trusting commitment in the interaction with the facilitator, who can be considered 
trustworthy because s/he shows commitment to her/his role.  
Differently from socialization, education takes place  in organizations, from relatively small-scale 
organization such as   school classes to large-scale organizations  as the  school systems. For that 
reason, while discussing the social foundation of educational relationship, it is necessary to take into 
account a source of trust connected to organizational structures, which  is not included in Giddens’ 
repertoire,  that is, trust based on categorical inequalities.  
In order to explain this type of trust it is necessary to introduce its theoretical  presupposition, which 
may be recognized in  Tilly’s idea that  inequality becomes embedded in the organizational 
structures (Tilly 1998). This is particularly true for education, which is a system in which inequality 
among individual performances and goal attainment is at the same time a basic structural feature of 
social relationships  (selection motivates the acceptance of educational communication) and an 
expected output of the system. 
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Tilly elaborates an inventory of causal mechanisms through which categorical inequality is 
generated and sustained by organizations. Tilly argues that certain kinds of social structural 
relations are solutions to problems generated within social systems. This does not mean that he 
argues for a smooth, homeostatic kind of functionalism in which all social relations organically fit 
together in fully integrated social systems. The functional explanations in Tilly’s arguments allow 
for struggles and contradictions. Nevertheless, his arguments rely on functional explanations insofar 
as at crucial steps of the analysis he poses a problem generated by a set of social relations and then 
treats the demonstration that a particular social form is a solution to the problem as the core of the 
explanation of that social form. 
For instance, education creates, through selective events, categorical forms of inequality. In 
education, durable, categorical distinctions make easier to knowing who to trust and who to 
exclude. As Tilly puts it: “organizational improvisations lead to durable categorical inequality”.  
Children, and adolescents are categorized and those categorical inequalities become stable features 
of organization because they enhance the stability of educational relationships. 
Categorical inequalities pose new challenges to organizations since they potentially constitute the 
bases for deviant solidarities opposed to the dominant categories. On the one hand, they sustain 
stable educational relationships; on the other hand, they also potentially reduce transaction costs for 
collective struggles by subordinates. Categorical inequality, in short, sets in motion a pattern of 
contradictory effects.  To the extent a given form of categorical inequality can be diffused 
throughout the education system (“emulation”) so that it appears ubiquitous and thus inevitable, and 
to the extent people living within these relations of categorical inequality elaborate daily routines 
(“adaptation”) which enable them to adapt to the conditions they face, then the categorical 
inequalities themselves will be stabilized. The result is that the excluded groups along the axes of 
categorical inequality are less likely to form the kinds of oppositional solidarities that pose a serious 
threat to the beneficiaries of  educational selection. 
Tilly  distills the core explanation of categorical inequality to three positions:  (1) Organizationally 
installed categorical inequality reduces risks. Categorical inequalities sustain in the risky choice to 
accord or not trust. This is a claim about the effects of categorical inequality on the stability of 
organizational relationships: the former stabilizes the latter; (2) Organizations whose survival 
depends on stability therefore tend to adopt categorical inequality. This is a selection argument: the 
functional trait, categorical inequality,  is adopted because it is functional, (3) Because 
organizations adopting categorical inequality deliver greater returns to their dominant members and 
because a portion of those returns goes to organizational maintenance, such organizations tend to 
9 
 
crowd out other types of organizations. With regard to educational organization, the limitation of 
risks free resources for the attainment of curricular goals. This is, in effect, a quasi-Darwinian 
selection explanation which explains why the functional traits generalize.  
In educational situations, categorical distinctions make it easier to know whom to trust and whom to 
exclude. On the one hand they stabilize social relationships, on the other hand they stabilize 
position of marginalization. The stabilization  of educational organizations, that is, their condition 
of possibility, has a paradoxical consequences, that is, to limit the potential of the organizations 
themselves in accomplishing their institutional goal, that is, to socialize all individuals. 
Tilly explicitly argues that the functional arrangements need not be created by design when he 
states “Inadvertently or otherwise, those people set up systems of social closure, exclusion and 
control.” What matters is that certain traits, categorical inequalities in this case, become stable 
features of organization because they enhance the survival of organizations that have such traits, 
and that as a result over time organizations with such traits predominate. The adoption of the 
organizational trait in question may be a conscious strategy intentionally designed to enhance 
exploitation and opportunity hoarding, but equally it may result from quite haphazard trial and 
error. 
Taking into account Tilly’s inventory of causal mechanisms through which categorical inequality is 
generated and sustained by organizations, it appears clear that institutional trust and institutional 
distrust may be understood as consequences of the operations through which educational 
organization reproduce themselves.  However, the problems of institutional distrust are well known, 
and described in terms of alienation, self-marginalization and educational failures. It is for that 
reason that an important concern for education has become to place side by side to trust based on 
categorical inequality,   a form of trust which could be able to sustain children’s and adolescents’  
involvement in the system.  
 
3. Promoting alternative forms of trust. Some insights from an empirical study on peace 
education 
From a pedagogical perspective, the problem is to evaluate whether or not  facilitation may 
substitute categorical inequalities as a basis for trust in educational activities. Some important 
insights on that issue are offered by a recent study regarding  two international summer camps 
promoted by the School of Peace of Monte Sole, established in the Province of Bologna (Italy), in 
the place where in 1944 a Nazi assault killed almost 800 children, women and old people may 
provide (Baraldi and Farini 2010).   
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We briefly outline the context of the study. Each summer camp lasted two weeks, and was attended 
by four delegations of ten adolescents coming from different countries, two of which were always 
Italy and Germany, to symbolize peaceful resolution of extreme conflict. The other two were 
Serbian and Albanian Kosovo (first camp), France and Poland (second camp). The camps aimed to 
promote adolescents’ ability in conflict resolution, their interest in peaceful relationships and their 
respect for different perspectives, and reducing their prejudices and stereotypes. English was 
normally used as a lingua franca during the activities.  
The activities were not part of a school programme which can satisfy adolescents’ self-interest 
enhancing their individual careers; adolescents’ voluntary participation was based on personal 
motivation. The fact that the activities were not part of a school programme implied that 
categorization processes based on  selective events (examinations, tests and so on) couldn’t take 
place. Therefore. the presupposition  of the stability of ordinary educational relationships, that is, 
trust based on categorical inequalities, must to be substituted by a different form of trust. Was 
facilitation capable to build an alternative form of trust, based on interpersonal affective 
relationship? 
The context of the camps was not favorable for a form of trust based on affectivity:  voluntary 
participation did not assure the success of peace education, because the nature and details of 
peaceful relationships were unknown to the participants and were created only in group interactions. 
Participants did not share ideas, values or principles; rather, at least some of them (i.e. Serbs and 
Albanians) shared the perspective of unavoidable differences and conflicts. Since peace was far 
from being a common practice in adolescents’ social environment, the risk of distrust could not be 
avoided and trust had to be built in the interaction. 
We believe that the summer camps  represent an interesting case-study: in order to sustain 
participation of adolescents,  a form of trust which is not based on categorical inequalities must be 
created in the interaction. Education to peace and dialogue must be inclusive: the creation of areas 
of marginalization would represent complete failure of the educational project. All participants  
need to participate actively in the activities, as participation is the presupposition of experience of 
dialogue and working trust. Under these conditions, facilitation is requested to promote  
adolescents’ trusting commitment, to enable their participation in communication, and to assure 
their mutual responsiveness in a situation where trust based on categorical inequalities is not 
available.  
The analysis of the interactions which took place in the summer camps highlights  three types of 
facilitators’ actions promoting adolescents’ trusting commitment: 1) promotional questions (Baraldi 
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2009), which open alternatives for adolescents’ actions, demonstrating facilitators’ trust in their 
agency and active participation; 2) feedback questions, which verify and explore the understanding 
of adolescents’ interpretations, demonstrating attentiveness to their needs; 3) formulations (Hutchby 
2007), which both demonstrate responsiveness to adolescents’ needs and open alternative 
possibilities for adolescents’ actions.   
These types of actions  promoted adolescents’ and facilitators’ mutual trusting commitment, in a 
situation where  trust based on categorical inequalities was excluded. Moreover, while trust based 
on categorical inequalities  makes it easier to know whom to trust and whom to exclude, stabilizing 
social relationships, it  also stabilizes position of marginalization. On the contrary, in the context of 
our study, these types of facilitators’ action  enhanced adolescents’  mutual accommodation and 
upgraded  their authority,  avoiding unintended consequences of education by increasing the 
possibilities of active participation. 
Below, we offer a short example of these three types of actions, taken from an activity called 
“borders and bridges”, where adolescents are asked to take pictures of objects which represent 
either borders, as symbols of separation, or bridges, as symbols of contact, and to interpret these 
pictures in the group discussion.  The excerpt aims at illustrating promotional questions, feedback 
questions and formulations, within the frame of an empirical educational activity. 
 
Marek (Facilitator):        it's a bridge 
Alain (Facilitator):         for Marek it is a bridge 
Leni (Facilitator):         for me too 
Alain (Facilitator):         for Leni too ((3 seconds pause)) and for you, boys and girls? 
Matthias:                      for me it is a border and also a bridge because it doesn't divide  
Federica (Facilitator):  so, you mean that a border is not always dividing two things maybe 
then, it  can be also? 
Matthias:         yeah, in some way, yes 
Federica (Facilitator):     and what do you mean for the border or the bridge? 
Luca:  I think that a border is a line where two things are  near, nearby 
 
In this excerpt, alain’s coordination of  the interaction  downgrades facilitators’  authority as experts 
and upgrades the adolescents’ interpretation; with his lexical choices (“for him/her”), Alain 
introduces the facilitators’ interpretation as hypothetical (“for Marek is a bridge”; “for Leni too”), 
thus putting forward the legitimacy of different interpretations. Furthermore, Alain deals with this 
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interpretation as subject to the adolescents’ authority: after a meaningful long pause, which 
indicates the expectation of new interpretations in the group, he involves the adolescents through a 
promotional question (“and for you, boys and girls?”), which is  a cue for his trust in the 
adolescents’ agency, suggesting  that they have the right to produce interpretations in the same 
measure as facilitators. 
Following  Matthias’ response, which  introduces new opportunities for interpretation, Federica’s  
formulation of Matthias’ turn highlights its interactional relevance, while encouraging new action 
on his part. The formulation is followed by a new promotional question (“it can be also?”), which 
gives Matthias the opportunity to reject Federica’s position, promoting alternatives for next actions. 
Matthias ambiguous alignment (“in some way”) projects a new question, which is prefaced by a 
sequential marker (“and”) that stresses continuity with the previous turn. This is a feedback question 
whereby Federica explores the meanings of Matthias’ interpretation, showing attentiveness to it and 
treating it as relevant to the interaction, therefore upgrading Matthias’ authority in interpretation.  
Another adolescents, Luca immediately self-selects as principal interlocutor, expanding on 
Matthias’ interpretation. On the one hand, Luca’s self-selection shows that the interaction has 
successfully opened alternatives for new actions and expansions; on the other hand, it shows he is 
risking trust in the facilitator’s interest for the adolescents’ interpretations.   
 
4. Conclusions: avoiding unintended consequences of educational intentions 
During the last two decades, scholars and social planners have been giving particular attention to 
the connection between lack of trust, loss of confidence in the educational relationship and perverse 
effects of educational intentions.   
Facilitation is considered an effective means of building trust in group interaction in educational 
situations, and in situations of distrust;  trustworthiness of facilitators is considered a crucial starting 
point for building trust. However, the meaning of facilitation is controversial. On the one hand, 
studies on children-adults relationships stress that facilitation enhances interpersonal affective 
relationships; facilitation is understood as active promotion of agency and support of personal 
expressions, and trusting commitment requires affective expectations. On the other hand, studies on 
situations of distrust stress that facilitation is not based on interpersonal relationships, as building 
trust requires mutual accommodation and joint solution of problems, based on self-interest (working 
trust). 
Combining Gidden’s theory of trust in modern society with  the  concept of trust based on 
categorical inequalities, developed  on the basis of Tilly’s reflection on the function of inequalities 
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in organizations,  it is possible to observe that  trust in educational activities is generally based on 
educators’ expertise and  categorical inequalities. These two sources of trust are intertwined: 
educators’ expertise legitimizes  their role as evaluators in the frame of institutionalized selective 
events,  selective events produces material references to build and develop categorical inequalities. 
Both trust based on expertise and trust based on categorical inequalities open the floor for problems 
of institutional distrust. Again, these two types of trust are coupled: the effects of one form are the 
presuppositions of the other. In the education system, trust based on categorical inequalities builds 
systems of social closure, exclusion and control, where children or adolescents may experience 
anxiety about the future outcome of present actions, with a general suspicion towards educators’ 
expertise, which creates the material foundations of categorization (selection). These problems are 
well known, and described in terms of alienation, self-marginalization and educational failures. It is 
for that reason that an important concern for education has become to place side by side to trust 
based on categorical inequality,  a form of trust which could be able to sustain children’s and 
adolescents’  involvement in the system 
The analysis of educational activities in the summer camps  shows that in a situation  where trust 
based on categorical inequalities and trust based on expertise are  normatively and materially 
excluded, unintended consequences of education such as self-marginalization and alienation, may 
be avoided through facilitation. The  relationship between facilitation and the creation of alternative 
to the coupling between  trust based on categorical inequalities and trust based on expertise is of 
particular interest, because trust is understood as a resource  to avoid unintended consequences of 
education. Trust increases the possibilities of adolescents’ active participation, avoiding perverse 
effects of  educational intentions  such as alienation and self-marginalization, by reducing  their  
anxiety and suspicion for interlocutors. 
In school education, which has the function to socialize, but also to select, marginalization and self-
marginalization may be understood as a side effect of lack of trust, but also of trust based on 
categorical inequalities,  which solve problems of stabilization for the educational organizations. 
For a project aiming to educate to peace and dialogue, on the contrary, selection and exclusion are 
consequences to avoid, so it becomes important to create effective conditions for trusting 
commitment,  promoting possibility for social action and relationships,  avoiding marginalization, 
alienation and  loss of confidence in the educational relationship.  
The study in international summer camps organized by Monte Sole School of Peace offered us an 
opportunity to reflect on a form of facilitation that is effective, at least in some cases,  in promoting 
trust, where trust based on categorical inequalities, created by means of selective events, was 
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excluded,  on the one hand because of the methodology  and goals of the educational intervention, 
and on the other hand because of the nature of the educational activities, which were not part of a 
school programme.    
This form of facilitation  is based on patterns of expectations regarding (1) facilitators’ personal 
commitment, which permeates their role performances, and makes them trustworthy, and (2) 
affective results (affective expectations). It is a form of facilitation is a form of mediation (Baraldi 
2010) if facilitators’ questioning and formulating actively coordinate interactions between the 
parties. Our analysis show some ways in which facilitators’ actions create the conditions of 
adolescents’ trusting commitment in group activities; this enhances a reflection on the relationship 
between trust building and avoidance of the unintended consequences of education related to lack of 
trust. Education is a system where trusting commitment in specific interactions is vital for its 
reproduction; in education, creating effective conditions for trusting commitment means promoting 
possibility for social action and relationships, thus avoiding marginalization, alienation and  loss of 
confidence in the educational relationship. Thus, trust building maybe intended as a strategy to 
avoid  unintended consequences of education.   
Taking into account  Tilly’s idea of categorical inequality,  we have moved from the theoretical 
presupposition that  education is a system in which inequality among individual performances and 
goal attainment is at the same time a basic structural feature of social relationships   and an expected 
output of the system. While categorical distinctions make easier to knowing who to trust and who to 
exclude, on the one hand they stabilize social relationships, on the other hand they stabilize position 
of marginalization. Institutional trust and institutional distrust may be understood as consequences 
of the operations through which educational organization reproduce themselves. The (often 
unintended) consequences of institutional distrust are well know, in terms of alienation, self-
marginalization, educational failures. Our study suggests that facilitation is may be effective in 
creating   a form of trust which could be able to sustain children’s and adolescents’  involvement in 
the system, surrogating the coupling between trust based on categorical inequality and trust based 
on expertise. 
At least in the educational contexts we have analyzed, facilitation can dramatically change 
educational interactions, preventing marginalization, self-marginalization and the other unintended 
consequences of education related both to  lack of trust and to trust based on categorical 
inequalities. How far it can get along with education in different contexts can be the object of 
further and much broader research. 
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